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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-ADEQUACY OF NOTICE BY PUB-
LICATION - In condemnation proceedings instituted by a city against a 
landowner, notice of proceedings to determine his compensation was given 
only by publication in the official city newspaper. The statute in force 
called for notice either in writing or by publication.1 After the time 
authorized for appeal from a compensation award had elapsed, the land-
owner brought an equitable action to enjoin the city from entering upon 
the property, alleging that he knew nothing of the condemnation proceed-
ings until after the time for appeal had passed. The trial court denied 
relief, holding that the newspaper publication was sufficient notice to 
meet due process requirements. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed.2 
On appeal, held, reversed. The notice by publication falls short of due 
process requirements. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that 
the landowner did not allege that the compensation was inadequate. Jus-
tice Burton dissented on the ground that the notice provision was within 
the scope of legitimate local discretion. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 
352 U.S. 112 (1956). 
In recent years all discussion of the question of adequacy of notice 
under the due process clause has been colored by Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Trust Co.3 There the Court utilized the general test that 
"within limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calcu-
lated to reach interested parties,"4 and held notice by publication to known 
beneficiaries of a common trust fund insufficient. Although the decision 
is carefully limited to the situation before the Court, its reasoning created 
doubts as to the constitutionality of procedures in various state statutes 
which called for less than personal notice.5 Specifically, the finding that 
publication alone is not a reasonable means of informing interested parties$ 
and the Court's refusal to delve into the subtleties of the in rem-in personam 
1 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §26-202. This section was amended in 1955 to 
require that the city must mail a copy of the newspaper notice to the last known residence 
of the property owners unless such residence could not be located by diligent inquiry. 
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1955) §26-202. 
2 178 Kan. 263, 284 P. (2d) 1073 (1955). 
3 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
4 Id. at 318. 
5 For a comprehensive treatment of the Mullane case and its effect upon various state 
statutes see Perry, "The Mullane Doctrine-A Reappraisal of Statutory Notice Require-
ments,'' CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 32 (1952). The statutory reaction to the 
case is discussed in 39 IowA L. R.Ev. 665 (1954). For its possible effect upon probate 
procedures see 50 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1951). 
6 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., note 3 supra, at 315. 
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distinction7 indicated that a more stringent application of due process 
might replace the former tolerance toward state determination of proper 
notice.8 A degree of speculation as to the eventual scope of the Mullane 
case is still necessary, but the decisions after it, especially the principal 
case, at least show that it will be broadly applied. Noti~e by publication 
is proper where the names, interests, and addresses of persons are un-
known,9 but better notice is necessary to inform a creditor in a railroad 
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act.to Similarly, the Court found 
that even personal service was inadequate in an action to enforce a tax 
lien· against a known incompetent.11 Mailed notice wa5 sufficient, how-
ever, to inform a landowner in a large city who failed to receive it because 
of the misconduct of his bookkeeper.12 The principal case is the most 
striking application of the Mullane doctrine to date for condemnation 
is classified. as an action in rem by a government, and in this area publica-
tion has long been regarded as adequate.13 Although there is no decision 
of the Court holding directly that publication was sufficient notice in a 
condemnati~n proceeding against a known resident, the tenor of the cases 
wh,ich were distinguished in the principal case emphatically support the 
practice.14 Final judgment is reserved as to the effect of the Mullane 
reasoning upon these earlier cases,15 but it is apparent that their authority 
is greatly weakened.1 6 Since most statutes require more than mere pub-
lication in condemnation actions,17 the effect of the principal case will be 
7 "But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are 
so elusive and confused generally. . • ." Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., note 3 
supra, at 312. See Fraser, "Actions In Rem," 34 CoRN. L.Q. 29 (1948), and Fraser, "Juris-
diction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case," 100 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 305 (1951). 
s See, e.g., Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890). See generally Perry, "The Mullane 
Doctrine-A Reappraisal of Statutory Notice Requirements," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE 
LEGISLATION 32 (1952); 70 HARV. L. R.Ev. 125 (1957). 
9 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951). 
10 New York v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953). 
llCovey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956). See 55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 287 (1956). 
12 Nelson v. New York City, 352 U.S. 103 (1956). 
13 Collins v. Wichita, (10th Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 132, cert. den. 350 U.S. 886 (1955), 
upheld the same statute found inadequate in the principal case. See North Laramie 
Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925). See also 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, 3d ed., 
§4.103(2] (1950); 1 Mmuuu., NOTICE §518 (1952). 
14See Huling v. Kaw Valley Railway, 130 U.S. 559 (1889), upholding notice by 
publication to a nonresident landowner; North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, note 13 
supra, at 285, interpreting earlier cases as holding that notice by publication was consti-
tutionally sufficient. The Hoffman case was distinguished in the principal case on the 
basis of the state decision which showed that notice actually had been mailed. Principal 
case at 117. 
15 "Since appellant is a resident of Kansas, we are not called upon to consider the 
ex.tent to which Mullane may have undermined the reasoning of the Huling decision." 
Principal case at 116. 
16 See Fraser, "Actions In Rem," 34 CoRN. L.Q. 29 at 43 (1948), criticizing distinctions 
between notice requirements to residents and nonresidents. Since the mails are equally 
effective as to both, the Mullane reasoning seems to obviate this distinction. 
17 See Perry, "The Mullane Doctrine-A Reappraisal of Statutory Notice Require-
ments," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 32 at 118 (1952). 
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felt in only a few areas. Where only publication is required, however, the 
validity of past condemnation actions is uncertain.1 8 The principal case 
also opens the door to possible invalidation of another procedure where 
publication has been regarded as satisfactory because the action is in rem, 
viz., governmental tax foreclosure.1 9 It is likely, however, that the reason 
which supported such practices in the past-the need for expeditious tax 
enforcement20- may continue to temper the due process requirement. It 
is unfortunate that the Court in the principal case chose to distinguish 
the cases formerly regarded as controlling in this area and thereby add 
to the uncertainty which is the aftermath of the Mullane decision.21 The 
rule at present appears to be that the best notice which is feasible must 
be given to known interested parties. Distinctions between in rem and 
in personam, resident and nonresident, and governmental and private 
actions seem to have no effect on the due process requirement except as 
they affect feasibility. The myth that notice by publication is reasonably 
calculated to inform interested parties appears to be shattered.22 Only a 
strong showing of administrative necessity would be likely to validate 
proceedings wholly based upon such notice. 
Cyril Moscow, S.Ed. 
18 This fear is expressed by Justice Burton. Principal case at 127. 
10 See Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904). The cases are collected in 160 A.L.R. 1026 
(1946). For an excellent review of the authorities see Newark v. Yeskel, 5 N.J. 313, 74 A. 
(2d) 883 (1950). 
20 See note 19 supra. 
21 Various interpretations of the scope of the Mullane case can be found in Newark 
v. Yeskel, note 19 supra; Estate of Pierce, 245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W. (2d) 894 (1953); Tilley, 
"The Mullane Case: New Notice Requirements," 30 MICH. ST. B.J. 12 Qan. 1951); mate-
rial in note 5 supra. Conflicting interpretations of the Mullane case caused the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court to split evenly, thereby affirming an order sustaining a demurrer to the 
complaint of a landowner who attacked publication notice of a special assessment. The 
case was eventually remanded to the state court for consideration in the light of the prin-
cipal case and ultimately was reversed. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Milwaukee, 263 
Wis. 111, 56 N.W. (2d) 784 (1953), order sustaining demurrer to amended complaint 
affd. per curiam 272 Wis. 575, 76 N.W. (2d) 341 (1956), probable jurisdiction noted and 
case remanded 352 U.S. 948 (1956), order amended 352 U.S. 958 (1957), revd. (Wis. 1957) 
81 N.W. (2d) 298. 
22 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., note 3 supra, at 315; New York v. N.Y., 
N.H. &: H. R. Co., note 10 supra, at 296; principal case at 116. 
